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Abstract
We present a model of nancial crises that stem from endogenous complexity.
We conceptualize complexity as banksuncertainty about the nancial network of
cross-exposures. As conditions deteriorate, cross-exposures generate the possibility
of a domino e¤ect of bankruptcies. As this happens, banks face an increasingly com-
plex environment since they need to understand a greater fraction of the nancial
network to assess their counterparty risk. We show that complexity dramatically
amplies banksperceived counterparty risk, and makes relatively healthy banks,
and hence potential asset buyers, reluctant to buy. Our mechanism takes place
in an otherwise stable (by construction) network of limited cascades. The model
features a complexity externality which provides a rationale for various government
policies used during the Subprime and European crises, including bailouts and asset
purchases.
JEL Codes: G1, E0, D8, E5
Keywords: Uncertainty, complexity, counterparty risk, re sales, nancial net-
work, domino e¤ects, market freezes, crises, nancial panic, credit crunch, external-
ity.
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One of the most damaging aspects of nancial crises is the enormous uncertainty they
generate, and a central factor behind this uncertainty is the complexity of the linkages
among modern nancial institutions (banks, for short). The concern for the uncertainty-
complexity combination, and the perverse re-sales that accompany it, inuences private
and public choices alike. Fed Chairman Bernanke, in his testimony to the Senate on April
3, 2008 following the Feds Bear Stearns intervention, captures this concern as follows:
Our nancial system is extremely complex and interconnected, and Bear
Stearns participated extensively in a range of critical markets. The sudden
failure of Bear Stearns likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions
in those markets and could have severely shaken condence. The companys
failure could also have cast doubt on the nancial positions of some of Bear
Stearnsthousands of counterparties and perhaps of companies with similar
businesses.... Moreover, the adverse impact of a default would not have been
conned to the nancial system but would have been felt broadly in the real
economy through its e¤ects on asset values and credit availability.
Unfortunately, Chairman Bernankes testimony would prove prescient only a few
months later during the Lehman episode, when the demise of the investment bank wrecked
havoc all around the world. Moreover, the concern for a repeat of such turmoil is the
central reason behind the multiple recent attempts to insulate the rest of Europe from
the sovereign debt problems of its periphery.
In this paper, we present a model of crises that builds upon the idea that complex-
ity, which is a dormant factor during normal times, becomes acutely relevant and self-
reinforcing during crises. Complexity matters in our model not directly (and in this sense
this is not a networkspaper) but through the uncertainty it generates and how economic
agents react to the latter.
The basic structure of our model is a network of cross-exposures between nancial
institutions (banks, for short) that is susceptible to a domino e¤ect of bankruptcies.
However, we make assumptions such that domino e¤ects are of limited size, in the absence
of our informational mechanism. In this context, we conceptualize complexity by banks
uncertainty about cross-exposures. In particular, banks have only local knowledge of cross-
exposures: They understand their own exposures, but they are increasingly uncertain
about cross-exposures of banks that are farther away (in the network) from themselves.1
1In pratice, banks also face many other sources of complexity (e.g., about asset payo¤s). Our modest
goal in this paper is to focus on one source of complexity (about the structure of cross-exposures), and
to understand the role this type of complexity plays during crises.
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During normal times, banks only need to understand the nancial health of their direct
counterparties. In contrast, when a surprise liquidity shock hits parts of the network, a
domino e¤ect of bankruptcies becomes possible, and banks become concerned that they
might be indirectly hit. Banksuncertainty about cross-exposures, a dormant factor in
normal times, suddenly becomes relevant. In particular, banks now need to understand
the nancial health of the counterparties of their counterparties (and their counterparties).
Since banks only have local knowledge of the exposures, they cannot rule out an indirect
hit. They now perceive signicant counterparty risk which leads them to retrench into a
liquidity-conservation mode.
This structure exhibits strong interactions with secondary markets for banksassets.
Banks in distress can sell their legacy assets to meet the surprise liquidity shock. The
natural buyers of the legacy assets are other banks in the nancial network, which may
also receive an indirect hit. When the surprise shock is small, the domino e¤ect is small
and buyers can rule out an indirect hit. In this case, buyers purchase the distressed banks
legacy assets at their fairprices (which reect the fundamental value of the assets). In
contrast, when the surprise shock is large, larger domino e¤ects become possible and
buyers cannot rule out an indirect hit. As a precautionary measure, they hoard liquidity
and turn into sellers. The price of legacy assets plummets to re-salelevels (i.e., below
fundamentals), which in turn exacerbates the domino e¤ect.
This feedback mechanism can generate multiple equilibria for intermediate levels of
the surprise shock. When legacy assets fetch a fair price in the secondary market, the
banks in distress have access to more liquidity, and the surprise shock is contained after
fewer bankruptcies. When the domino e¤ect is smaller, the natural buyers rule out an
indirect hit and demand legacy assets, which ensures that these assets trade at their fair
prices. Set against this benign scenario is the possibility of a re-sale equilibrium where
the price of legacy assets collapses to re-sale levels. This leads to a greater number
of bankruptcies and a larger domino e¤ect. With a larger domino e¤ect, the natural
buyers become worried about an indirect hit and they sell their own legacy assets, which
reinforces the collapse of asset prices.
Our model features a distinct complexity externality, which stems from the dependence
of bankscounterparty risk on the endogenous size of the domino e¤ect. In particular,
any action that increases the size of the domino e¤ect increases the counterparty risk
perceived by banks that are uncertain about the nancial network, and banks dislike this
e¤ect. Our model features two variants of this complexity externality (one non-pecuniary,
one pecuniary), each of which supports di¤erent government policies. First, a bailout
of the distressed banks nanced by small lump-sum taxes on all the banks may lead
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to a Pareto improvement. The market equilibrium is unable to replicate this allocation
because each bank fails to take into account that its contribution to a bailout will reduce
the counterparty risk faced by all other banks. Second, in the range of multiple equilibria,
policies that increase asset prices may lead to a Pareto improvement by coordinating
the banks on the fair-price equilibrium. In this range, the re-sale equilibrium is Pareto
ine¢ cient because a bank that sells assets does not take into account the e¤ect of its
decision on other bankscounterparty risk. In particular, this bank generates a (small)
reduction in asset prices, which in turn leads to a larger domino e¤ect and a greater
counterparty risk, real and perceived, for all other banks.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. There is an extensive literature
that highlights the possibility of network failures and contagion in nancial markets. An
incomplete list includes Rochet and Tirole (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a), Allen and
Gale (2000), Laguno¤ and Schreft (2000), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000), Eisenberg
and Noe (2001), Dasgupta (2004), Leitner (2005), Cifuentes, Ferucci and Shin (2005),
Rotemberg (2008), Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2010), Zawadowski (2011), Acemoglu et
al. (2011) (see Allen and Babus, 2009, for a survey). Many of these papers focus on
the mechanisms by which solvency and liquidity shocks may generate a domino e¤ect in
the nancial network. In contrast, we take these phenomena as the reason for the rise
in banksuncertainty and we focus on the e¤ect of this uncertainty on banksprudential
actions. It is also worth pointing out that the uncertainty mechanism we emphasize in
this paper is operational even for a relatively small amount of network contagion. The
contagion literature is sometimes criticized because it appears unlikely that many nancial
institutions would be caught up in a domino e¤ect of bankruptcies.2 But as this paper
illustrates, even partial domino e¤ects can have large aggregate e¤ects since they greatly
increase counterparty risk and trigger widespread prudential (non-bankruptcy) actions.3
Our paper is most directly related to the literature on ight-to-quality and Knightian
uncertainty in nancial markets, as in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Routledge
and Zin (2004), Easley and OHara (2005), and Hansen and Sargent (2010). Our contri-
bution relative to this literature is in generating the uncertainty from the complexity of
the nancial network itself. Our work complements a number of recent papers that focus
2See Upper (2007) for a survey of the empirical literature that uses counterfactual simulations to
assess the danger of contagion. Regarding this literature, Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud,
and Shin (2009) note that it is only with implausibly large shocks that the simulations generate any
meaningful contagion.
3The role of domino e¤ects in elevating complexity and uncertainty was also highlighted in Haldanes
(2009) speech, who nicely captures the mechanism when he wrote that at times of stress knowing your
ultimate counterpartys risk becomes like solving a high-dimension Sudoku puzzle.
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on other sources of uncertainty during crises. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) show
that exogenous uncertainty is amplied in a re sales episode, because price uncertainty
increases natural buyersbalance sheet uncertainty (which in turn feeds back into price
uncertainty). Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom (2010) show that uncertainty (and asymmet-
ric information) in credit markets increases during crises because debt contracts become
information sensitive.
In the canonical model of re sales, these happen because the natural buyers of the
assets experience nancial distress simultaneously with sellers (see Shleifer and Vishny,
1992, 1997, and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997b). More recently, Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2008) show that, when there are few players, unconstrained potential buyers may choose
not to arbitrage re sales in the short run because they anticipate a better deal in the
future. Our model lies somewhere in between these two views: Most potential buyers
are unconstrained, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), but they are fearful of going
about their normal arbitrage role because of uncertainty (and in this sense they are
distressed as in Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). It is the complexity of the environment that
sidelines potential buyers and exacerbates the re sales. Importantly, this mechanism
works even when the number of market participants is large.4
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section I, we describe the environment
for a benchmark case with no uncertainty about cross-exposures. Section II characterizes
the equilibrium for this benchmark and illustrates the mechanics of (partial) domino
e¤ects in our setting. Section III contains our main results. There, banks have only
local knowledge about cross-exposures, and a su¢ ciently large shock increases banks
counterparty risk and leads to re sales in secondary markets. This section also highlights
the interaction between counterparty risk and re sales, and demonstrates the possibility
of multiple equilibria. In Section IV, we describe the complexity externality and its policy
implications. Section V discusses the role of a number of key assumptions. The paper
concludes with a nal remarks section and several appendices.
4Other papers that investigate the mechanisms for re sales and asset price dislocations in nancial
markets include Allen and Gale (1994), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Geanakoplos (2003, 2009), Loren-
zoni (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2010), Garleanu and
Pedersen (2010), Stein (2010), Diamond and Rajan (2010), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) (see
Shleifer and Vishny, 2011, for a recent survey). More broadly, this paper belongs to an extensive literature
on nancial crises that highlights the connection between panics and a decline in the nancial systems
ability to channel resources to the real economy (see, e.g., Caballero and Kurlat, 2008, for a survey).
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I. Basic Environment and Equilibrium
We consider an economy with three dates f0; 1; 2g and a single consumption good (a
dollar). The economy has n continuums of nancial intermediaries (banks, for short)
denoted by fbjgn 1j=0 . Each of these continuums is composed of identical banks. For
simplicity, we refer to each continuum bj as bank bj, which is our unit of analysis.5 Banks
start with a given balance sheet at date 0 (which will be described shortly), but they only
consume at date 2. Banks can transfer their date 0 dollars to date 2 by investing in one of
two ways. First, banks can keep their dollars in cash which yields one dollar at the next
date per dollar invested. Second, banks can also invest in an asset. Each unit of the asset
yields R > 1 dollars at date 2 (and no dollars at date 1). The asset is supplied elastically
at date 0 at a normalized price of 1.
While the asset yields a higher date 2 return than cash, it is completely illiquid at date
1. In particular, it is not possible to sell or borrow against the asset at date 1. (Thus, a
bank cannot convert the asset to dollars at date 1.) This assumption captures the standard
liquidity-return trade-o¤, which is prevalent in nancial markets. The microfoundations
that lead to this trade-o¤ are well known (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). One can
think of the cash in this model as the liquid securities, such as US treasuries, which yield
lower return but which retain their market value at times of distress. In contrast, the asset
can be thought of as illiquid securities, such as asset backed securities, which potentially
yield a higher return but which lose their market value at times of distress.
Each bank initially has y dollars and 1   y units of legacy assets. At date 0, which
is the only meaningful decision date in our model, banks can trade legacy assets in a
secondary market at an endogenous price p. This price cannot exceed 1 because legacy
assets and new assets are identical (and the price of the latter is 1). We also assume
that the natural buyers of legacy assets are the other banks in the model. In particular,
outside agents (lower valuation users) demand the asset elastically at a discounted price
pscrap < 1. Thus, if legacy assets are sold to outside agents, they fetch a price p = pscrap.
We refer to this situation as a re sale of legacy assets.
The basic premise of our model can now be informally described. An unexpected
liquidity shock generates the possibility that banks might need dollars at date 1. This in
turn shifts banksinvestments at date 0 from the asset to cash (ight-to-quality), which
has two e¤ects: First, as banks stop buying new assets, there is a credit crunch. Second,
as banks stop buying legacy assets (and as they try to sell their own legacy assets to raise
dollars), there is a re sale of legacy assets in the secondary market. The contribution
5The only reason for the continuum is for banks to take other banksdecisions as given.
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Figure 1: The initial balance sheet of a generic bank.
of our paper is to describe the role of complexity associated with counterparty risk in
generating this ight-to-quality episode. To this end, we gradually introduce the main
ingredients of our model.
A. Cross-exposures and the Financial Network
At date 0, each bank has short term debt claims worth z dollars on one other bank, which
we call the forward neighbor bank. We assume that short term debt cannot be rolled
over and it must be paid back at date 1, which will be without loss of generality.6 On
the liability side, the bank also has z dollars of short term debt claims held by another
bank which we call the backward neighbor bank. The initial balance sheet of a bank is
illustrated in Figure 1.
The role of these cross debt claims is to capture various types of unsecured cross-
exposures that are common in the nancial system, and the counterparty risk that they
bring about. One source of cross-exposures is interbank loans. Upper (2007) documents
that interbank loans constitute a large fraction of banksbalance sheets in many Euro-
pean countries.7 A second and potentially much larger source of cross-exposures is OTC
derivative contracts (such as interest rate swaps or credit default swaps) traded between
6Appendix A considers an extension of the model in which banks have the option to roll over and
shows that the equilibrium is unchanged.
7To give two examples, Upper (2007) notes: at the end of June 2005 interbank credits accounted for
29% of total assets of Swiss banks and 25% of total assets of German banks.
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nancial institutions. Bank for International Settlements reports that gross credit ex-
posures in OTC derivative markets in G10 countries and Switzerland had exceeded $5
trillion by the end of 2008.8 The cross debt claims of this model can be viewed as captur-
ing the uncollateralized portion of these exposures (although the Lehman crisis revealed
that even fully collateralized repo loans can be frozen by bankruptcy courts).
In Caballero and Simsek (2009) we provide one rationale (out of many) for cross-
exposures from their role in facilitating bilateral liquidity insurance, as in Allen and
Gale (2000). In this paper, we take the exposures as given and we analyze their role in
generating ight-to-quality episodes.
Bankscross-exposures form a nancial network. For simplicity, we assume that the
network takes the form of a circle. An example for a circle network is the following:
The notation, bj    bj+1, illustrates that bank bj+1 has debt claims on bank bj. Note
that banks are ordered around a circle, with bank b0 having debt claims on bank bn 1.
We conceptualize complexity about counterparty riskwith banksuncertainty about
the nancial network. In particular, banks have only local knowledge of cross-exposures:
They understand their own exposures, but they are increasingly uncertain about cross-
exposures of banks that are farther away (in the network) from themselves. We capture
this notion by assuming that banks have only local knowledge about the nancial network :
They know the identity of their forward neighbor bank (on which they have debt claims),
but they do not know how the rest of the banks are ordered around the circle (i.e., which
banks are exposed to which other banks).
To formalize this ingredient, we need to consider a larger set of networks than the
above example. To this end, consider a template nancial network which is described in
8Source: BIS semiannual OTC derivatives statistics. Gross credit exposures take into account bilateral
netting between the same pair of counterparties. Gross market values of exposures, which do not take
into account this netting, is much larger (more than $20 trillion in interest rate derivatives and more than
$5 trillion in credit derivatives by the end of 2008).
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terms of nancial slots to be lled by banks:
.
Next consider a permutation,  : f0; 1; ::; n  1g ! f0; 1; ::; n  1g, which assigns bank j
to slot i =  (j). Note that the bank assigned to slot i has debt claims on the bank that is
assigned to slot i  1. However, the identities of these banks depend on the permutation,
, which introduces uncertainty about the nancial network. In particular, we let:
N = f j  : f0; 1; ::; n  1g ! f0; 1; ::; n  1g is a permutationg (1)
denote the set of all possible nancial networks. The earlier example corresponds to the
particular realization in which each bank is assigned to the same slot as its identity.
We capture banksuncertainty over the network by assuming that banks do not know
the realization, . In particular, let N j ()  N denote the set of nancial networks
which bank bj nds possible given the actual realization, . We refer to the collection
fN j ()gj; as an uncertainty model for banks.9
B. Surprise Shock and BanksResponse
At date 0, the banks learn that a rare event (which they had not anticipated at the
unmodeled date  1) has happened and one bank, b0, will become distressed. Similar to
Allen and Gale (2000), in order to remain solvent this bank needs to make  dollars of
payment (to an outsider) at date 1.
This outside debt is senior to the short term debt to the neighbor bank (it can be
equivalently interpreted as a shock to the value of the banks assets in a version of the
model in which banks have heterogeneous assets).10 Consequently, these losses might
9A simpler alternative to the permutations is to have banks ordered in the circle in the same order as
the locations (i.e. bank 1 in location 1, bank 2 in location 2, etc.) and have the uncertainty be about the
identity of the bank in distress rather than about the linkages between the banks. We chose the slightly
more cumbersome route of permutations because it aligns better with the idea of complexity that we want
to capture here. But mechanically, the results would be very similar with the alternative formulation.
10In pracice, banks are also highly leveraged, which implies that even small reductions in the value of
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spill over to other banks via the nancial network and may bring them into nancial
distress at date 1. To prepare for date 1, at date 0 the banks take one of the following
actions Aj0 2 fS;Bg, which are restricted to a binary choice set for simplicity.11 As a
precautionary measure, the bank may choose Aj0 = S, to invest all of its y dollars in cash
and to sell all of its legacy assets 1   y in the secondary market, keeping a completely
liquid balance sheet. Alternatively, the bank may choose Aj0 = B, to be a potential buyer
of assets. In this case, the bank retains its own legacy assets on its balance sheet and it
uses its dollars to buy either new or legacy assets (whichever is more protable).
The bank chooses Aj0 to maximize its equity value at date 2, subject to meeting its
debt payment at date 1. Given the rare event, a bank may not be able to pay back its
debt in full (despite the precautionary measures it might take), but instead it ends up
paying qj1  z. Similarly, the value of banks date 2 equity may be qj2  R. Note that
either the bank is solvent, pays qj1 = z, and its date 2 equity value is q
j
2  0; or the bank
is insolvent, pays qj1 < z and its date 2 equity value is q
j
2 = 0.
The bank makes its decision at date 0 while facing Knightian uncertainty about the
network, and the counterparty risk that it might bring about. In particular, the bank
considers the range of possible nancial networks, N j (), and it chooses an action that is
robust to this uncertainty. Formally, let
 




denote the banks debt and equity
payment in equilibrium given the nancial network, . We follow Gilboa and Schmeidler






qj2 (~) . (2)
As we discuss in Section V, Knightian uncertainty is not necessary for our main results
(risk aversion su¢ ces) but it is both realistic in this context and technically convenient.
C. Secondary Market and Equilibrium
Legacy assets are traded in a centralized exchange that opens (just) at date 0. Given the
legacy asset price p, the banks that choose Aj0 = S sell all of their legacy assets (1   y
units for each bank) while the banks that choose Aj0 = B are potential buyers of legacy
assets could lead to large losses of capital. Thus, the empirical counterpart of  is the leveraged losses
su¤ered by the bank because of a shock to its assets.
11This assumption does not a¤ect any of the qualitative conclusions of the model, as demonstrated by
an earlier version of this paper, Caballero and Simsek (2009).
12The preferences captured by (2) are a special case of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) in which the set of
priors consist of the convex hull of the Dirac delta measures corresponding to the networks, ~ 2 N j ().
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assets and may spend up to y (their dollars). If p < 1, potential buyers spend all of their y
dollars on legacy assets, while if p = 1, they are indi¤erent between buying legacy or new
assets. Recall that pscrap < 1 denotes the valuation of outside agents. Thus, the market















 0, if p = 1
= 0, if p 2 (pscrap; 1)
 0, if p = pscrap
. (3)
The rst term on the left hand side denotes the total supply of legacy assets while the
second term denotes the maximum potential demand. If the left hand side of Eq. (3) is
negative for each p 2 [pscrap; 1], then legacy assets trade at their fair value 1, potential
buyers are indi¤erent between buying legacy and new assets, and they buy just enough
legacy assets to clear the market. If the left hand side of Eq. (3) is 0 for some p 2 [pscrap; 1],
then p is the equilibrium price. If the left hand side is positive for each p 2 [pscrap; 1],
then there is excess supply of legacy assets and their price is given by pscrap.
Denition 1. An equilibrium is a collection of bank actions, debt payments, and equity
values,
h
Aj0 () ; q
j







, and a price level p 2 [pscrap; 1] for legacy assets
such that, given the realization of the nancial network , each bank bj chooses its actions
according to the worst case nancial network that it nds possible [cf. problem (2)] and
the legacy asset market clears [cf. Eq. (3)].
To characterize the equilibrium, it is useful to dene the notion of a banks distance
from the original distressed bank. The latter bank, b0, has distance d = 0 from itself.
The backward neighbor of the original distressed bank has distance d = 1. Similarly, the
backward neighbor of the backward neighbor has distance d = 2. This way, each bank
can be assigned a unique distance for each realization of the network. The distance is the
only payo¤ relevant variable in this economy. In particular, as we formally show in the
appendix, the banksequilibrium payo¤s and actions can be written as a function of their
distance. That is, there exist functions A0 [] ; Q1 [] and Q2 [] such that: 
Aj0 () ; q
j




= (A0 [d] ; Q1 [d] ; Q2 [d]) , (4)
where d denotes the distance of bank bj given the network .
In the next section, we will demonstrate that a bank is insolvent, Q1 [d] < z, if and
only if it is su¢ ciently close to the original distressed bank. Similarly, a bank chooses a
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precautionary action, A0 [d] = S, if and only if d is su¢ ciently small. In view of these
observations, we dene the following notions of a domino e¤ect and a ight-to-quality
which facilitate the characterization of equilibrium.










(i) There is a domino e¤ect of size D if banks with distance d  D   1 are insolvent
[i.e., they pay qj1 < z] while banks with distance d  D are solvent [i.e., they pay qj1 = z].
(ii) There is a ight-to-quality of size F if banks with distance d  F   1 choose
Aj0 = S while banks with distance d  F choose Aj0 = B.
Note that D also corresponds to the number of banks that are insolvent, and F
corresponds to the number of banks that choose the precautionary action. In subsequent
sections, D and F will be useful to summarize the equilibrium in this economy.
II. Equilibrium in the No-Uncertainty Benchmark
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium with no-uncertainty, which provides a
benchmark for our main results with complexity (in terms of the information structure,
it essentially corresponds to the Allen and Gale, 2000, environment). We show that,
if the number of banks is su¢ ciently large, then there only can be a partial domino
e¤ect and a partial ight-to-quality, that is, D < n and F < n. Moreover, D and F
are proportional to the size of the initial shock, . That is, when banks have perfect
knowledge of the nancial network, a su¢ ciently deep nancial system is resilient to
perturbations. These benign results contrast with those we obtain in the next section
once we introduce complexity.
Formally, consider the (no) uncertainty model, N j () = fg for each j, so that each
bank knows the realization of the nancial network. In this benchmark, we characterize
the equilibrium under the following parametric conditions:
ny > de and z + y + (1  y) pscrap  . (5)
Here, dxe denotes the ceiling function, that is, the unique integer such that dxe   1 <
x  dxe. The rst condition in (5) says that the nancial system has su¢ cient aggregate
liquidity to meet the unexpected liquidity shock, . The second condition simplies the
notation but does not play an essential role.
Our characterization consists of three steps. First, we characterize a generic banks
optimal action (and solvency) taking the payo¤s and actions of other banks as given.
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Second, we take the asset price, p, as given and we characterize the partial equilibrium
corresponding to banks actions and payo¤s. And third, we characterize the general
equilibrium price and allocations.
A banks optimal action depends on its liquidity need at date 1. The liquidity need of
a bank with distance d, is:
z  Q1 [d  1] +  [d = 0] (6)
(where  [] denotes the product of  and the indicator function). The rst term captures
the payment the bank needs to make on its short term debt. The second term captures the
equilibrium payment the bank receives from its forward neighbor. The last term captures
the additional payment that the original distressed bank needs to make. A bank with a
liquidity need of zero optimally chooses the aggressive action, Aj0 = B, to maximize its
equity value at date 2. In contrast, a bank with a strictly positive liquidity need would
be insolvent (and would be liquidated at date 1) if it chose the aggressive action. Thus,
it is optimal for this bank to choose the precautionary action, Aj0 = S (cf. Appendix B).
By taking the precautionary action, the bank keeps its y dollars in cash and sells 1   y
units of legacy assets in the secondary market, obtaining an available liquidity of:
l (p) = y + (1  y) p. (7)
If l (p) is greater than the banks liquidity need in (6), then the bank will be able to avoid
insolvency by choosing the precautionary action. Otherwise, the bank will be insolvent
despite taking the precautionary action.
It follows that the bank chooses the precautionary action, Aj0 = S, if its liquidity need
is strictly positive, and it is insolvent if its liquidity need is strictly greater than l (p). We
next use this characterization to solve for the partial equilibrium: that is, the optimal
actions and payo¤s of all banks taking the price, p, as given.
Proposition 1 (Partial equilibrium in the no-uncertainty benchmark). Suppose
the price of legacy assets are xed at p 2 [pscrap; 1] and the conditions in (5) hold. Then,







and a ight-to-quality of size F = D (p) + 1 (cf. Denition 2). Both the domino e¤ect
and the ight-to-quality are contained, i.e., D (p) < n and F < n.
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Figure 2: The partial domino e¤ect and ight-to-quality in the no-uncertainty benchmark.
Figure 2 illustrates this result, the proof of which is relegated to the appendix. In-
tuitively, a number of banks that have the shortest distance to the original distressed
bank have a positive liquidity need. Thus, these banks choose the precautionary action,
Aj0 = S. By doing so, each of these banks uses its available liquidity, l (p), to meet their
liquidity need to some extent. In particular, as the shock propagates from one bank to
another, the liquidity need decreases by l (p). The initial liquidity need, , is fully met





= D (p) + 1 banks. It follows that
banks with distance d  D (p) choose the precautionary action. Moreover, all but the last
one of these banks are insolvent. The last bank with distance d = D (p) avoids insolvency
because it is able to meet its liquidity need fully. This bank pays its backward neighbor
bank in full. Consequently, the banks with distance d > D (p) have a zero liquidity need.
These banks choose the aggressive action, Aj0 = B. It follows that there is a domino e¤ect
of size D (p) and a ight-to-quality of size D (p) + 1.
Eq. (8) shows that the size of the domino e¤ect is proportionalto the ratio of the
size of the shock to the banksavailable liquidity, =l (p). A larger shock naturally leads
to a larger domino e¤ect. A reduction in available liquidity for banks also leads to a
larger domino e¤ect. Intuitively, this is because, when l (p) is lower, banks that choose
the precautionary action are less able to ght the shock. We next state the main result
of this section which characterizes the general equilibrium price and allocations.
Proposition 2 (General equilibrium in the no-uncertainty benchmark). Consider
the no-uncertainty benchmark and suppose the conditions in (5) hold. Then,
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(i) The unique equilibrium price is p = 1 (no re sales).
(ii) There is a domino e¤ect of size de   1 and a ight-to-quality of size de.
(iii) The aggregate amount of new asset purchases is: Y = ny   de.
This result follows by combining Proposition 1 with the secondary market clearing
condition (3). Note that the banks with distance d  D (p) choose Aj0 = S and sell all
of their existing assets. The remaining banks choose Aj0 = B, i.e., they are potential
buyers of assets. Condition (5) ensures that, for any price p 2 [pscrap; 1], the demand from
potential buyers exceeds the supply from distressed banks. This implies that the unique
equilibrium price is p = 1. Given this price, the size of the domino e¤ect is characterized
by Proposition 1. The aggregate new asset purchases is calculated by considering the
asset demand by potential buyers net of the legacy asset supply by distressed banks (see
the proof in the appendix).
Intuitively, if the domino e¤ect is only partial and banks know the nancial network,
then there exist safe banks which will not make losses from cross-exposures and know that
much. These banks do not sell assets and are ready to use their dollars to purchase assets
from distressed banks. When the aggregate liquidity of the nancial system is su¢ ciently
large [cf. condition (5)], the demand from these potential buyers ensures that legacy assets
trade at their fair price 1.
Figure 3 illustrates this result by plotting the equilibrium variables as a function of
the initial shock, . Note that the price is xed at 1, the size of the domino e¤ect is
increasing in , and the aggregate new asset purchases is decreasing in . Intuitively, as
 increases, there are more losses to be contained, which further spreads the insolvency.
As the insolvency spreads, more banks keep their dollars in cash, which lowers Y. Note,
however, that Y decreases smoothlywith . These results o¤er a benchmark for the
next section. There we show that once auditing becomes costly, both D and Y may
experience large changes with small increases in .
III. Equilibrium with Complexity
We next introduce our key ingredient, complexity, which we model as banksuncertainty
about cross-exposures. As we will see, in this context when the shock is small, the system
behaves exactly as in the benchmark. But when the shock is large, banksuncertainty
about cross-exposures becomes relevant since they need to understand distant linkages.
Their inability to gure out these linkages leads to a complex environment and increases
banksperceived counterparty risk. This increase in complexity (and associated counter-
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Figure 3: Equilibrium in the no-uncertainty benchmark. The top, the middle, and
the bottom panels respectively plot the size of the domino e¤ect, the asset price, and the
aggregate new asset purchases as a function of the losses in the originating bank.
party risk) overturns the relatively benign implications of the benchmark environment.
Formally, we consider the uncertainty model:
N j () =
(
~
 such that bj is in slot i and bforward neighbor is in slot i  1,where i =  (j) .
)
. (9)
Note that the bank knows its slot and its forward neighbors slot: Thus, it also knows the
identity of its forward neighbor bank. However, the bank is unsure about how the rest
of the banks are ordered in the rest of the circle.13 We next characterize the equilibrium
by repeating the analysis of Section II for this uncertainty model. The characterization
similarly consists of three steps: (i) banksoptimal actions, (ii) partial equilibrium for a
given p, and (iii) general equilibrium price and allocations.
Recall from Section II that in the no-uncertainty benchmark a bank (with distance d)
chooses the precautionary action, Aj0 = S, if and only if its liquidity need is strictly posi-
tive. With uncertainty, the bank does not necessarily know its exact liquidity need in (6).
This is because the bank does not necessarily know the amount, Q1 [d  1], it will receive
13In an earlier version, we assumed that each bank also knows the identity of its backward neighbor
(which has claims on it). This assumption does not change any of the results. Intuitively, this information
would only be relevant if the bank faced uncertainty about whether its backward neighbor will withdraw
its debt claims early. Appendix A shows that in this model all banks withdraw their debt claims early.
Thus, the identity of backward neighbor is not useful information.
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from its forward neighbor. Nonetheless, Appendix C shows that the characterization of
the banks optimal action is equally simple in this case: It chooses its action, Aj0, as if it
will receive with certainty the lowest possible payment from its forward neighbor.
Using the fact that banks have only local knowledge of the network, we can further
characterize their optimal actions. First consider a bank with distance d  1. Given
the uncertainty model in (9), this bank knows its distance. Consequently, it knows the
payment, Q1 [d  1], it will receive from its forward neighbor. Thus, the optimal action
of this bank is characterized exactly as in the no-uncertainty benchmark.
Next consider the optimal action of a bank with distance d  2. This bank is uncertain
about its distance, and it nds possible all distances ~d 2 f2; 3; ::; n  1g. Consequently, it




, it will receive from its forward neigh-
bor. The worst case scenario obtains when the bank is at the closest possible distance,
~d = 2. It follows that this bank chooses its optimal action as if it is at distance ~d = 2. Put
di¤erently, the banks that are uncertain about their distances to the distressed bank choose
their precautionary action as if they are closer to the distressed bank than they actually
are.
The following proposition, which is the analogue of Proposition 1 for this setting,
characterizes the partial equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Partial equilibrium with complexity). Consider the economy with
network uncertainty. Suppose the price of legacy assets is xed at p 2 [pscrap; 1] and the





  1 denotes the size of the domino e¤ect
in the no-uncertainty benchmark [cf. Eq. (8)].
(i) If   2l (p) [so that D (p)  1], then there is a domino e¤ect of size D (p) and a
ight-to-quality of size F = D (p) + 1.
(ii) If  > 2l (p) [so that D (p)  2], then there is a domino e¤ect of size D (p) and a
ight-to-quality of size F = n.
Figure 4 illustrates this result by plotting the equilibrium actions (and solvencies)
corresponding to the two cases. The rst case concerns a liquidity shock, , that is
smaller than the available liquidity of two banks (i.e., the original distressed bank and its
backward neighbor). In this case, part (i) of the proposition (and the rst panel of Figure
4) shows that the partial equilibrium is the same as in the no-uncertainty benchmark. To
see this, recall that banks at distance d  2 act as if they are at distance 2. In this case,
the liquidity shock is su¢ ciently small that the bank at distance 2 does not su¤er any
losses from cross-exposures. Consequently, banks with distance d  2 optimally choose
16
Figure 4: The partial domino e¤ect and the precautionary actions with network uncer-
tainty. The top panel illustrates the rst case of Proposition 3,   2l (p). The bottom
panel displays the second case,  > 2l (p).
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the aggressive action. This leads to the same partial equilibrium as in the no-uncertainty
benchmark. The proof in Appendix C formalizes this argument.
The second case concerns a liquidity shock, , which is greater than the available
liquidity of two banks. In this case part (ii) of the proposition (and the second panel
of Figure 4) shows that the equilibrium features a much larger ight-to-quality than the
no-uncertainty benchmark. In particular, all banks in the nancial system choose the
precautionary action, Aj0 = S. To see this, note that the liquidity shock in this case is
su¢ ciently large to generate a domino e¤ect of at least size 2. Thus, it is optimal for a
bank at distance 2 to choose the precautionary action, Aj0 = S. Consequently, banks with
distance d  2 also choose the precautionary action. This leads to a ight-to-quality of
size n.
Intuitively, if the domino e¤ect (generated by the initial shock) is su¢ ciently small,
the environment is simple in the sense that banksuncertainty about the nancial network
does not generate counterparty risk. In particular, banks who are uncertain about their
distance ~d can rule out an indirect hit. Hence these banks continue to act as in the no-
uncertainty benchmark despite being uncertainty averse. In contrast, if the domino e¤ect
is su¢ ciently large, then the environment is complex in the sense that banksnetwork
uncertainty generates counterparty risk. That is, banks that are uncertain about their
distance cannot rule out an indirect hit. Since they are uncertainty averse, they respond
by choosing the precautionary action.
The following proposition jointly characterizes the equilibrium price and allocations.
Proposition 4 (General equilibrium with complexity). Consider the economy with
network uncertainty and suppose the conditions in (5) hold.
(i) Unique fair-price equilibrium: If   2l (pscrap), then there is a unique equi-
librium with price p = 1 (no re sales). There is a domino e¤ect of size D (1) = de   1
and a ight-to-quality of size F = de. The aggregate amount of new asset purchases is
Y = ny   de.
(ii) Unique re-sale equilibrium: If  > 2, then there is a unique equilibrium with






and a ight-to-quality of size F = n. The aggregate amount of new asset purchases is
Y = 0.
(iii) Multiple equilibria: If  2 (2l (pscrap) ; 2], then there is a fair-price equilibrium
as in part (i) and a re-sale equilibrium as in part (ii).
Figure 5 illustrates this result. There is a unique equilibrium for su¢ ciently small and
large levels of , but there are multiple equilibria for intermediate levels of . Note also that
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Figure 5: Equilibria with network uncertainty. The panels plot various equilibrium
variables as a function of the shock, . The top panel plots the size of the domino e¤ect
in partial equilibrium, D (p), for price level p = pscrap (dashed line) and price level p = 1
(solid line). The second panel plots the general equilibrium price, p. The last panel plots
the aggregate new asset purchases, Y.
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the fair-price equilibrium is the same as the equilibrium in the no-uncertainty benchmark
(cf. Proposition 2), while the re-sale equilibrium is very di¤erent. In particular, the re-
sale equilibrium features a greater ight-to-quality than the no-uncertainty benchmark
(F = n vs. F = de). This large precautionary reaction generates a re-sale in the
secondary asset market (p = pscrap). It also leads to a larger credit-crunch than the
no-uncertainty benchmark (Y = 0 vs. Y = ny   de).
Proposition 4 is our main result and it shows that as the initial losses (measured by
) increase, the equilibrium makes a very large and discontinuous jump compared to the
no-uncertainty benchmark. This jump could be realized either in the region of multiple
equilibrium if banks coordinate on the precautionary action, or in the region of single
equilibrium if initial losses are su¢ ciently large. The resulting equilibrium features a
ight-to-quality episode that is disproportionate to the size of the initial shock. The
central ingredient for this result is complexity, that is, banks uncertainty about the
nancial network.
The proof of Proposition 4 is relegated to the appendix. Intuitively, when  is su¢ -
ciently small, the size of the domino e¤ect is manageable (i.e., below the critical threshold
of 2) regardless of the price of legacy assets. In this case, the environment is simple (i.e.,
banksnetwork uncertainty does not generate counterparty risk). In contrast, when  is
su¢ ciently large, the size of the domino e¤ect is unmanageable and the environment is
complex (i.e., banksnetwork uncertainty generates counterparty risk) regardless of the
price.
For intermediate levels of , the interaction between the asset price and complexity of
the environment generates multiple equilibria. If legacy assets trade at their fair price,
then there is more market liquidity to counter the initial liquidity shock. This leads to a
smaller domino e¤ect and a simple environment. Since the environment is simple, banks
that are uncertain about their distance are potential buyers in the secondary market,
which ensures that legacy assets trade at their fair price. Set against this benign scenario is
the possibility of a re-sale equilibrium, in which the price of legacy assets collapses. This
reduces market liquidity available to distressed banks, which leads to a larger domino e¤ect
and a complex environment. Facing a complex environment, banks that are uncertain
about their distance panic and sell their legacy assets, which reinforces the collapse of
asset prices.
Note also that, whenever there are multiple equilibria, the fair-price equilibrium Pareto
dominates the re-sale equilibrium for all banks. This observation suggests that there are
externalities in our setting, which we analyze next.
20
IV. Complexity Externality and Policy Implications
Our model features a complexity externality, which stems from the dependence of banks
counterparty risk on the endogenous size of the domino e¤ect. In particular, any action
that exacerbates the domino e¤ect increases the counterparty risk perceived by banks
that are uncertain about the nancial network, and they dislike this e¤ect. Our model
features two variants of this complexity externality (one non-pecuniary, one pecuniary),
each of which supports di¤erent types of policies. The rest of this section discusses the
two variants and their policy implications.
A. Nonprice Complexity Externality and Bank Bailouts
To illustrate this externality, it is useful to start with a simple example. Consider an






Here, xi denotes agent is endowment, ai 2 f0; 1g denotes a costly action taken by agent
i, and u () denotes a standard and strictly concave utility function. Suppose also that





In particular, each agent can take a costly action that can (slightly) reduce the variance
of endowments of all agents in this economy.
In this example, consider respectively the equilibrium and the planners allocations.
In equilibrium, no agent takes the costly action because she incurs a positive cost while
having only a negligible e¤ect on the variance of its own consumption. On the other
hand, for su¢ ciently small c > 0, a social planner would have all agents choose ai = 1.
This allocation gives each agent a constant consumption at a relatively small cost (by
assumption), which is a Pareto improvement over the equilibrium allocation.
In this example, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto ine¢ cient because of a non-
pecuniary externality that operates through the production technology. In particular, an
agent i does not internalize the fact that her action a¤ects the endowment variance of all
other agents. By choosing ai = 0, this agent exerts a negative externality on all other
agents, which leads to a Pareto ine¢ ciency.
We next describe the nonprice complexity externality of our model, which is reminis-
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cent of the externality in this example. To this end, consider the setup of Proposition
3, that is, suppose there is network uncertainty and prices are exogenously xed (which
shuts down any pecuniary channels). Suppose also that
 2 (2l (p) ; 3l (p)) , (10)
which ensures that there is a domino e¤ect of size 2 and a ight-to-quality of size n (cf.
Proposition 3). In particular, all banks choose the precautionary action, Aj0 = S. Banks
Minimax utility at date 0 [cf. Eq. (2)] is given by:(
0, if d < 2.
3l (p)   2 (0; l (p)) , d  2. (11)
In this setting, consider a modication of equilibrium by introducing the possibility of
a bailout of the distressed bank, b0, by other banks. In particular, each bank j can
choose to contribute some of her date 0 dollars, y, to a bailout fund. Without loss of





, that is: a bank
either contributes 0 dollars or 
n
dollars to the bailout fund. Note that contributing

n
dollars is feasible because the banks have su¢ cient aggregate liquidity by condition
(5). Once all contributions are made, the total amount in the fund is used to pay some
(possibly all) of the liquidity need, , of bank b0. The equilibrium is then characterized
as before with a potentially lower level of the shock for the original distressed bank and
a lower level of date 0 dollars for the contributing banks.
In this modied equilibrium, banks optimally choose to contribute 0 dollars to the
bailout fund (and thus, the equilibrium remains unchanged). To see this, consider a bank
with distance d  2. By contributing to the bailout fund, this bank incurs a positive
cost while receiving no benets. This is because this bank alone is not able to change
the size of the domino e¤ect (since it is innitesimal by assumption). On the other hand,
consider a social planner that requires all banks to contribute 
n
dollars. With this bailout
policy, the original distressed bank remains solvent and the domino e¤ect disappears.
In particular, bankscounterparty risk also disappears. Consequently, banks choose the
aggressive action, that is, they keep their legacy assets and they spend their remaining,
y   
n













Comparing Eqs. (11) and (12) shows that this bailout policy leads to a Pareto improve-
ment as long as n or R is su¢ ciently large. The fact that banks with distance d < 2 are
better o¤ is not remarkable because these banks are (either directly or indirectly) bailed
out. However, it is remarkable that all other banks at distance d  2 are also better o¤.
The equilibrium is Pareto ine¢ cient for the same reason as in the earlier example.
Each bank with distance d  2 does not internalize that its contribution, 
n
, would
mitigate the domino e¤ect, and thus, reduce the counterparty risk faced by other banks.
By not contributing, this bank exerts a negative externality on other banks, which we
refer to as the nonprice complexity externality. A bank bailout policy generates a Pareto
improvement by internalizing this externality. Viewed di¤erently, network stability (and
similarly, endowment stability in the earlier example) is a public good. Each bank would
like to enjoy this good because it reduces its counterparty risk. However, each bank would
rather not incur the costs and free ride on other banks. The bailout could be viewed as
the provision of the public good of stability, which solves the free rider problem.
We stress that the nonprice complexity externality is di¤erent than the re-sale exter-
nality that is common in the literature. In particular, in the above setting there cannot
be a re-sale externality because the asset price is xed. We next consider the setting
with endogenous asset price to illustrate the second variant of the complexity externality.
B. Price Complexity Externality and Government Asset Pur-
chases
This externality operates through the interaction of legacy asset prices and the size of
the domino e¤ect. In particular, a bank that decides to sell assets (i.e., that chooses the
precautionary action, Aj0 = S) has a (small) negative impact on asset prices. This in
turn has a (small) positive impact on the size of the domino e¤ect. In particular, with
a lower asset price, the available liquidity, l(p), of each bank is lower. Thus, the crisis is
contained after a greater number of insolvencies [cf. Eq. (8)]. The increase in the size of
the domino e¤ect increases the counterparty risk faced by other banks and lowers their
welfare, demonstrating the price complexity externality.
The price complexity externality is what leads to multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria
in our setup, as we have already seen in Proposition 4. In particular, an increase in
counterparty risk due to a reduction in the legacy asset price not only lowers the welfare
of many banks, but also induces these banks to take extreme precautionary measures,
which includes further asset sales. The sale of assets by banks in panic mode reduces
asset prices further, which leads to a vicious cycle culminating in the re-sale equilibrium.
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In contrast, an increase in asset prices reduces the counterparty risk, which may mitigate
the precautionary measures and turn more sellers into buyers, leading to a virtuous spiral
towards the fair price equilibrium. In particular, a social planner that puts a oor on
asset prices (e.g., through an asset purchase policy) can generate a Pareto improvement
by coordinating banks on the fair-price equilibrium.
We stress that the price complexity externality is also di¤erent than the usual re-sale
externality (e.g., in Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997b, or in Lorenzoni, 2008). It is true that both
externalities operate through asset prices. However, the commonalities end there because
the particular channels for the two externalities are di¤erent. In a re-sale externality,
the decrease in asset prices erodes the net worth of nancial institutions that are natural
buyers of this asset. This in turn tightens these institutionsborrowing constraints, which
lowers their welfare and puts further downward pressure on asset prices. Instead, in the
price complexity externality, the decrease in asset prices increases the counterparty risk
perceived by nancial institutions that are uncertain about the network. The increase in
counterparty risk (as opposed to binding constraints) is what lowers the welfare of these
institutions. Moreover, their precautionary reaction (as opposed to binding constraints)
is what puts further downward pressure on asset prices.
This comparison also suggests that the price complexity externality could be much
more potent than the re-sale externality. To see this concretely, consider a drop in the
price of subprime mortgage backed securities. From the lenses of the conventional re-
sale externality, this shock should mostly a¤ect the natural buyers of these securities. In
particular, it should not a¤ect much the institutions that specialize in other businesses
or other asset classes (or natural buyers that happen not to hold the securities at the
time of the shock). Instead, from the lenses of the price complexity externality, this shock
could have a much bigger impact. In particular, suppose the shock is su¢ ciently large
that it leads to the failure of some natural buyers and generates the possibility of domino
e¤ects. This in turn increases the counterparty risk faced by all nancial institutions that
are uncertain about the nancial network. In practice, this includes virtually all nancial
institutions, illustrating the much greater scope of the price complexity externality.14
Finally, it is also worth noting that the price complexity externality amplies the
standard overleverage result, e.g., in Lorenzoni (2008). The previous literature noted that
banks tend to leverage and invest too much ex-ante because they do not internalize the
re sale externalities their deleveraging generates during crises. Our model suggests that
14In our model, we assumed for simplicity that the natural buyers of the asset are the same as banks
that face network uncertainty. Instead, this discussion suggests natural buyers are likely to be a subset of
the banks that face network uncertainty. Our model could be easily modied to incorporate this feature.
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banks might choose to overleverage and overinvest for an additional reason: Because they
do not take into account the increase in counterparty risk their asset sales generate when
domino e¤ects become possible.
V. Discussion of Key Assumptions
The previous sections established that small shocks can dramatically increase bankscoun-
terparty risk in view of banksuncertainty about the nancial network of cross-exposures.
To illustrate the main mechanism, we made a number of strong assumptions. In par-
ticular, we assumed that the shock is unanticipated, that the network has a particularly
simple form, and that banks face Knightian uncertainty about the nancial network. In
this section, we discuss and support these assumptions.
A. The role of the unanticipated shock
In our model, banks do not anticipate the surprise shock (at date  1). If banks assigned a
su¢ ciently large probability to the shock, they would also naturally seek insurance against
it at the unmodeled date  1, and the nancial system would become more resilient to
the shock. However, the kind of shocks that we are trying to capture are by their very
nature either impossible or very costly to insure against. One could imagine two versions
of this insurance: (i) A specic insurance contract, such as bank bj receives some dollars
if bank b0 loses  dollarsor (ii) A blanket insurance contract, such as bank bj receives
some dollars if its forward neighbor is insolvent (i.e., a CDS on the forward neighbor).
We next argue that the rst type of (specic) insurance is implausible, while the second
type of (blanket) insurance is likely to be very costly and possibly ine¤ective during severe
systemic events.
Specic insurance contracts are not plausible due to the complexity of banksbalance
sheets. This complexity, which is the reason for network uncertainty in our model, also
naturally makes the event very di¢ cult to describe ex-ante. Arguably, banks would be
unable to tell if the shock would hit bank b0, or another bank, or a combination of banks.
In addition, they would also be unable to tell the size of the shock, and thus, the size
of the domino e¤ect that it would bring about. These observations resonate well with
the run-up to the recent crisis. Even though the possibility of the subprime losses was
discovered in the summer of 2007, the exact form and the magnitude of these losses
remained not well understood until 2008. Empirical evidence in support of this point
can be gleaned from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Quarterly Review for
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December 2007. Graph 4 of this review illustrates that the 5-year CDS spreads increased
for banks on average between June 2007 and December 2007. However, the same graph
also shows that the dispersion of large banksspreads actually decreased over the same
period, i.e., banksCDS spreads became closer to one another. The BIS review interprets
this lack of di¤erentiation as possibly reecting a continuing lack of transparency about
their (banks) exposures.
Even if specic insurance was not possible, banks could still purchase blanket insur-
anceagainst all possible shocks that could hit the nancial system. For example, a bank
could buy CDS on its forward neighbor, which would e¤ectively reduce its exposure, z,
and immunize it against any shock to the network. However, this type of insurance is
very costly because it comes as a bundle. In particular, while it insures banks against
systemic shocks that could generate domino e¤ects, it also insures them against garden
variety shocks which lead to the failure of their counterparty without a systemic compo-
nent. Banks might prefer not to buy insurance against the latter types of shocks which
are always present in the nancial system. If this is the case, then banks might nd it
optimal not to buy CDS insurance (or other types of blanket insurance) even though they
recognize the benets this would bring about during a systemic crisis.
A separate restriction on both specic and blanket insurance concerns the counterparty
risk in CDS contracts. During a systemic event, the sellers of these contracts might
themselves become distressed, and thus, might be unable to deliver on their promises.
This point is supported by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commissions (FCIC) January
2011 report on the causes of the nancial crisis, which quotes the managing director at
AIG Financial Products as saying: And were one of the few guys who can do that (sell
disaster insurance). Because if you think about it, no one wants to buy disaster protection
from someone who is not going to be around... That was AIGFPs sales pitch to the Street
or to banks.Ironically, when the disaster struck AIGFP was one of the rst institutions
to collapse. In particular, AIGFP would be unable to deliver on its insurance promises
absent an intervention by the Fed, which illustrates further the practical di¢ culty of
obtaining insurance against systemic events.15
Finally, one might imagine that banks could mitigate the counterparty risk in CDS
contracts by requiring the sellers to post su¢ cient collateral. Appendix D incorporates
15The unreliability of CDS insurance in the run-up to the crisis is also emphasized by Vause (2010), in
the BIS Quarterly Review for December 2010, as follows: Market participants responded to increased
concern about counterparty risk by buying protection on CDS dealers... But none of these trading
responses represented a comprehensive solution to the problem. Buying protection on one dealer from
another dealer is of limited value if there are systemic concerns about the robustness of counterparties in
the market.
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collateralized insurance contracts into our model and shows that the results are robust
to this extension. There, we consider the possibility that banks could purchase CDS
insurance on their counterparties at date 0, once the nature of the shock is understood
(which is the main di¤erence from a blanket insurance). We also require each CDS
contract to be individually and fully collateralized. In this setting, while banks demand
counterparty insurance at date 0, the supply of this insurance is restricted because of
sellerscollateral constraints. In particular, sellers within the nancial network choose not
to pledge their collateral in an insurance contract in view of their own payo¤ uncertainty
(in fact, they would rather demand insurance for their own cross-exposures). Thus, the
only insurance supply comes from sellers that are outside the network. When the collateral
of these sellers is small relative to the size of the network, allowing for collateralized
counterparty insurance does not change our qualitative results. This analysis is consistent
with the behavior of the CDS markets during the recent Bear Sterns and Lehman debacles.
As described by Du¢ e (2011), the demand for counterparty insurance in both episodes
spiked, but this demand could not be met by insurance sellers.
B. The role of the network structure
For simplicity, we assumed that the network structure takes the form of a circle. This
is an example of a highly incomplete network which tends to increase the likelihood of
contagion (cf. Allen and Gale, 2000). To illustrate the point, consider a more complete
network in which each bank has exposures (of z=2 each) to two other banks. In this case,
a shock  that leads to the insolvency of bank b0 would lead to a smaller liquidity need for
each of the backward neighbor banks [ l(p)
2
instead of    l (p)]. Consequently, it would
take a larger shock, , to generate a domino e¤ect.
In contrast, the incompleteness of the network does not play an important role for
our main result, panics driven by complexity, as long as we control for banksinformation
appropriately. To see this, consider the two networks illustrated in Figure 6. The left panel
concerns the circle network we have analyzed, with the additional assumption that banks
know the identities of their two forward neighbors (as opposed to just their immediate
neighbor). It is easy to see that all banks choose the precautionary action, Aj0 = S,
if there is a domino e¤ect of size at least 3, which in turn happens if the initial losses
satisfy  > 3l (p). The right panel illustrates an alternative three-tiered network in which
each bank in the bottom two tiers have exposures to two other banks (and the initially
distressed bank is in the top tier). For this network, we assume that the banks know the
identities of their immediate neighbors only. With this assumption, the banks have the
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Figure 6: The two panels illustrate ight-to-quality episodes in two networks that di¤er
in their completeness, but not in banksinformation about the network (measured as the
number of other banks whose locations each bank knows).
same amount of information as the rst case in the sense that they know the locations of
exactly two other banks. In this case, all banks in the bottom row choose the precautionary
action, Aj0 = S, if there is a domino e¤ect of length at least 2. This in turn happens if
the initial losses satisfy  > 3l (p), which is the same condition as in the rst case. Put
di¤erently, even though the second network is more complete, it takes a shock of the same
size to generate a ight-to-quality episode in both networks.16
Intuitively, while a more complete network features a shorter domino e¤ect, it also
generates a greater informational burden for banks. The more neighbors a bank has, the
more balance sheets it needs to inspect to assess its nancial health (and the nancial
health of its neighbors, and their neighbors etc). Consequently, controlling for the banks
information, it takes a smaller domino e¤ect to trigger a ight-to-quality episode in a
16It is also instructive to show a more general version of this result. Consider the network on the right
panel of Figure 6 with a large number of tiers (as opposed to three). Suppose banks know their neighbors
up to distance k, so that they know the locations of K  2 + :: + k other banks. It is easy to see that
a su¢ cient condition for a ight-to-quality episode is  > (K + 1) l (p). This is the same condition that
generates a ight-to-quality episode in the circle network when banks know their forward neighbors up
to distance K. Thus, the key determinants of a ight-to-quality episode is the size of the shock, , the
banksinformation, K (measured by the number of other bank-locations a bank understands), and the
available liquidity of each bank, l (p).
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more complete network. Figure 6 illustrates that, under appropriate assumptions (related
to the symmetry of the network), the two forces exactly cancel and the completeness of
the network does not a¤ect the incidence of panics.
It is also worth noting that banking networks in practice appear to be highly incom-
plete and specialized. Direct evidence for this point can be gleaned from the Bank of
Englands Financial Stability Report for June 2009. Chart 3.8 of this report plots the
network of large exposures between UK banks. While the UK banking network does not
exactly take the form of a circle (it looks more like a hub-and-spoke network), it shares
the key characteristic of being highly incomplete. Similarly, the US nancial network is
highly incomplete and concentrated, as evidenced by the recent regulatory attempts (in
particular, the Dodd-Frank act) to curb large and systemic banksexposures to a single
counterparty.17
C. The role of Knightian uncertainty about the network
The Knightian uncertainty, and the corresponding Maximin representation in (2), is not
essential for our results. In particular, our qualitative results also apply in a standard
expected utility framework as long as banks are risk averse (or as long as they are averse
to bankruptcy in view of xed costs). We consider the Maximin representation for two
reasons. First, it provides analytical tractability by enabling us to focus on the worst
case scenario, instead of specifying a distribution over N j () and taking expectations.
Second, and more importantly, Knightian uncertainty seems more appropriate for our
context than quantiable risk. Given the complexity of the network of cross-exposures in
real nancial markets, banks are unlikely to have a unique belief distribution over various
possible networks. Microeconomic studies (both empirical and theoretical) have argued
that economic agents are more averse to this type of uncertainty compared to quantiable
risks. The Maximin representation enables us to capture this feature in a tractable way.
17An important reason for the incompleteness of the network in practice is the heterogeneity in the
benets and the costs of forming links. To see this, consider the example of a bank that enters an interest
rate swap agreement in the OTC derivative markets. Depending on the movements of the yield curve, this
contract might generate exposures to bankscounterparties. In this setting, a more complete network
would correspond to the case in which the bank buys a small amount of swaps from a large number
of counterparties, thereby spreading its exposures across the network. However, this is unlikely to be
optimal for several reasons. First, some intermediaries might lack the necessary expertise to value this
swap, especially if the terms of the contract are complex. If this is the case, the bank would have to enter
the agreement with a few specialized intermediaries. Second, even the specialistsvaluations often di¤er
from one another, depending on their portfolio risks and beliefs. If this is the case, the bank would nd it
optimal to enter the agreement with the specialists that o¤er the best price, leading to a highly incomplete
network. More generally, heterogeneity in nancial institutionsvaluations of derivative contracts would
naturally lead to an incomplete network of exposures in the OTC derivative markets.
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That said, the Maximin representation corresponds to an extreme form of ambiguity
aversion which provides quantitative amplication for our results. We could have instead
used the smooth ambiguity model of Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), which
would lead to similar qualitative conclusions but milder quantitative e¤ects.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we provide a model that illustrates how re sales can arise even when
nancial markets are deep and the shock is small relative to the wealth in the nancial
network. The key ingredient for this outcome is complexity, which we have captured as
banksuncertainty about the network of cross-exposures. This feature, which is a dormant
factor in normal times, generates counterparty risk once banks are unable to gure out
their exposures to an indirect hit.
We also show that there is a powerful feedback between re sales and complexity. More
severe re sales amplify the potential domino e¤ects and increase bankscounterparty risk.
This triggers a precautionary reaction from potential asset buyers, which pull back and
exacerbate the re sale. In extreme scenarios these potential buyers can turn into sellers,
leading to a complete collapse in secondary markets.
We only partially explored policy questions, but it is apparent that our environment
creates many policy opportunities. In particular, the complexity externality supports
government actions during crises that are aimed at mitigating domino e¤ects (e.g., bailing
out distressed banks or asset purchases), as well as those that are aimed at reducing the
network uncertainty (e.g., stress testing, and widespread guarantees to banking liabilities
or assets). In addition, the complexity externality also supports preemptive measures
that are aimed at simplifying (and increasing the transparency of) the nancial network,
e.g., moving OTC transactions to exchanges.
A question that emerges in our environment is whether banks can aggregate their (lo-
cal) information about the nancial network. In our model, banks cannot credibly share
their information if we assume that distressed banks su¤er losses from revealing that they
are distressed (which is likely to be the case in reality). This is because banks that are
close to the original distressed bank have an incentive to misreport their distance, which
prevents the aggregation of information. More broadly, one could imagine many other
reasons why information production and sharing during a crisis is ine¢ cient, which em-
phasizes the importance of policies that provide information (e.g., stress testing, collecting
data on OTC transactions, living wills, etc.).
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As a parting thought, we note that the particular insolvency motive we consider raises
the question of what would happen if the distressed institutions chose to gamble for res-
urrection by not selling their assets, which would improve their outcome in good states at
the cost of a greater bankruptcy risk. Our model suggests that gambling for resurrection
may be a mixed blessing for the aggregate. Gambling by potential buyers, that is, insti-
tutions that are far from the domino e¤ect but that do not know this, would limit the
re sales and the downward spiral of prices. On the other hand, gambling by institutions
near the domino e¤ect would exacerbate contagion and trigger the complexity mechanism.
This issue also points to important policy trade-o¤s for the decision on which institutions
to guarantee during a systemic event.
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Appendix: Omitted Proofs and Extensions
A. Endogenizing BanksDebt Rollover Decision
In the main text, we have simplied the model by assuming that all short term debt
claims must be settled at date 1. In this appendix, we consider the extension of the
model with banksroll-over actions, and we show that the equilibrium is unchanged as all
banks choose to withdraw their debt claims immediately.
To see this, consider an extension in which each bank bj has an additional action at
date 1, Aj1 = W (~z) for some ~z 2 [0; z]. A bank that chooses Aj1 = W (~z) withdraws
~z dollars of its debt claims on its forward neighbor bank at date 1, and rolls over the
remaining z   ~z dollars of its debt claims to date 2. In this setting, consider a distressed
bank with a positive liquidity need at date 1 (e.g., the original distressed bank b0). This
bank could try to obtain the required liquidity either by withdrawing its debt claims at
date 1 (i.e., by choosing Aj1 = W (~z) for some ~z > 0) and/or by taking the precautionary
action at date 0 (i.e., by choosing Aj0 = S). Taking the precautionary action is strictly
costly for the bank because it sacrices equity value at date 2. However, withdrawing
debt claims is not costly. In fact, either the forward neighbor bank is insolvent, in which
case withdrawing is strictly better than rolling over (recall that each bank is small and
takes the debt payment of the forward neighbor bank as given), or the forward bank is
solvent in which case withdrawing and rolling over generate the same amount of equity
value. Hence, the bank always prefers ex-post withdrawal to the ex-ante precautionary
actions. In other words, the liquidity pecking order is such that a bank that will need
liquidity at date 1 rst chooses Aj1 = W (~z), and then (if there is need) resorts to ex-ante
precautionary measures.
Next consider the original distressed bank, b0, that will need at least  dollars of
liquidity. This bank withdraws a positive amount of its debt claims from its forward
neighbor, i.e., A01 = W (~z) for some ~z > 0. This puts the neighbor bank also in need of ~z
dollars of liquidity, which also withdraws ~z units of its debt claims on the forward neighbor.
As in Allen and Gale (2000), this triggers further withdrawals until, in equilibrium, Aj1 =
W (~z) for all j. Hence, the original distressed bank tries, but cannot obtain, any net
liquidity through cross debt withdrawals. In particular, this bank still needs at least 
dollars of liquidity after cross debt withdrawals. This further implies that, in equilibrium,
the bank withdraws all of its debt claims, i.e., ~z = z. Thus, no bank rolls over its debt
and all debt claims are settled at date 1. It follows that the equilibria analyzed in the
main text continue to be the equilibria in this setting with a more general action space
32
at date 1.
B. Equilibrium in the No-Uncertainty Benchmark
This appendix presents the analysis and the proofs omitted from Section II.
Characterizing banks optimal actions. Consider a bank with distance d. This
banks optimal action can be characterized by comparing its liquidity need in (6) and the
available liquidity in (7). There are three cases to consider. First, if the banks liquidity
need is zero, then it is not distressed. Since this bank does not need dollars at date 1,
it chooses the aggressive action, Aj0 = B, to maximize its equity value. Second, if the
banks liquidity need lies in the interval, (0; l (p)], then its available liquidity is su¢ cient
to meet its liquidity need. This bank chooses the precautionary action, Aj0 = S, to avert
insolvency at date 1 (which maximizes its equity value at date 2). Third, if the banks
liquidity need is greater than l (p), then its available liquidity is not su¢ cient to meet its
liquidity need. This bank is indi¤erent between choosing Aj0 = S or A
j
0 = B, because it
will be insolvent regardless of the action. Nonetheless, choosing the precautionary action
increases the liquidation outcome because it enables the bank to liquidate with time:
More specically, the banks assets yield l (p) dollars with the precautionary action and 0
dollars with the aggressive action. Thus, the precautionary action increases the payo¤ to
debtholders. Given that equity holders are indi¤erent, we restrict attention to equilibria
in which the bank [with liquidity need > l (p)] chooses the precautionary action, Aj0 = S.
Combining the three cases, note that the bank chooses the precautionary action, Aj0 =
S, if and only if its liquidity need is strictly positive. Moreover, the bank is insolvent
at date 1 if and only if its liquidity need is strictly greater than l (p). We next use this
characterization to solve for the partial equilibrium: that is, banksactions and payments
for a given price p.
Proof of Proposition 1. Under the claim in the proposition, the original distressed
bank (with distance 0) receives full payment from its debt claims on its forward neighbor,
i.e., Q1 [n  1] = z. Hence, the liquidity need of bank with distance 0 is  > 0. According
to the earlier characterization, this bank chooses the precautionary action, A0 [0] = S. If
  l (p), then this bank avoids insolvency and the size of the domino e¤ect is D (p) = 0,
which is consistent with (8).
Suppose instead  > l (p). In this case the bank with distance 0 is insolvent and pays
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Q1 [0] = z + l (p)   < z: (13)
where Q1 [0]  0 in view of the second condition in (5).18 Note that the bank receives
z dollars from its claims on its forward neighbor, has l (p) units of liquidity at date 1,
and it has to make a payment of  dollars. Thus, its backward neighbor bank (which has
distance 1) receives Q1 [0] < z from its debt claims, and it has liquidity need, (6), of
z  Q1 [0] =    l (p) : (14)
Here, the second expression comes from using (13) to substitute for Q1 [0]. Since we are
considering the case  > l (p), the neighbor bank also has a positive liquidity need, and
thus it chooses A0 [1] = S. If   2l (p), then the neighbor banks available liquidity, l (p),
is greater than its liquidity need. In this case, this bank is able to avoid insolvency and
there is a domino e¤ect of size D (p) = 1. Otherwise, the neighbor bank is also insolvent,
and it pays
Q1 [1] = l (p) +Q1 [0] .
From this point onwards, a pattern emerges. The payment by an insolvent bank with
distance d  1 is
Q1 [d  1] = l (p) +Q1 [d  2] = l (p) (d  1) +Q1 [0] .
Here, the rst equality shows that bankspayments are linearly increasing in their dis-
tance, and the second equality uses this property to solve for the payment of the bank
with distance d   1 in closed form. Using this expression along with Eq. (14), the bank
with distance d has the liquidity need:
z  Q1 [d  1] =    l (p) d. (15)
That is, banksliquidity needs are linearly decreasing in their distance, d. If  > l (p) d,
then the bank with distance d has a positive liquidity need, and thus chooses the pre-
cautionary action, A0 [d] = S. If   l (p) (d+ 1), this bank is able to avoid insolvency.
Otherwise, it is also insolvent despite taking the precautionary action.
Next note that D (p) dened in Eq. (8) is the rst nonnegative integer such that  
18Note that Q1 [0] = 0 when the second condition in (5) is violated. That is, the original distressed
bank pays zero on its debt claims because it is unable to make the outside payment. To accommodate
for this case, Eq. (13) could be modied to Q1 [0] = max (0; z + l (p)  ). The rest of the analysis would
be identical at the expense of additional notation.
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l (p) (D (p) + 1). Consequently, all banks with distance d  D (p)  1 are insolvent since
their liquidity needs are greater than their available liquidity, l(p). These banks choose
A0 [d] = S to improve their liquidation outcome. In contrast, bank with distance D (p) is
solvent since it can meet its losses by choosing the precautionary action, A0 [D (p)] = S.
Since this bank is solvent, all banks with distance d  D (p) + 1 are also solvent as
they do not incur losses in cross debt claims. These banks choose the aggressive action,
A0 [d] = B, to optimize their equity value. It follows that there is a domino e¤ect of size
D (p) and a ight-to-quality of size F = D (p) + 1. The rst condition in (5) also implies
that D (p) < n and F < n, completing the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. We complete the sketch proof provided in the paragraph
following Proposition 2. Suppose p 2 [pscrap; 1] and consider the banksasset supply and
demand. There are D (p) + 1 banks that choose Aj0 = S. The supply of assets from
these banks is given by (1  y) (D (p) + 1). The remaining n   D (p)   1 banks choose
Aj0 = B. The demand for assets from these banks is given by
y(n D(p) 1)
p
. We claim that
the demand exceeds the supply regardless of the price, that is:
y (n D (p)  1)
p
> (1  y) (D (p) + 1) for each p 2 [pscrap; 1] . (16)
By the secondary market clearing condition (3), this claim ensures that the equilibrium
price is p = 1, proving part (i). Given price p = 1, D and F are characterized by
Proposition 1, proving part (ii). Finally, the aggregate amount of new asset purchases is
equal to banksdemand for assets net of the supply of legacy assets. Taking the di¤erence
of the left hand side and right hand side of the inequality in (16) and using p = 1, we
have:
Y = ny   (D (1) + 1) = ny   de ,
proving part (iii).


















where the equality follows from the denition of l (p) in Eq. (7). To show this inequality,
note that:







where the rst inequality follows from condition (5) and the second inequality follows
since l (p)  1. This implies the claim in (16), completing the proof.
C. Equilibrium with Complexity
This appendix presents the analyses and proofs omitted from Section III. We rst present
the characterization of the banksoptimal actions. We then present proofs of Proposition
3 and 4.






Note that a su¢ cient statistic for bank bj with distance d to choose action Aj0 2 fS;Bg
is the amount it will receive in equilibrium from its forward neighbor. In particular, to
decide on the level of its precautionary measure, this bank only needs to know its liquidity
need in (6), which only depends on the debt payment of its forward neighbor. Formally,
if the bank chooses Aj0 at date 0 and its forward neighbor pays x at date 1, then this











However, the bank chooses Aj0 while facing uncertainty about the nancial network, and


















are weakly increasing in x for any choice of action. That is, the banks debt
and equity payments are increasing in the amount it receives from its forward neighbor
regardless of the ex-ante precautionary measure it takes. In view of the minimax opti-
mization [cf. problem (2)], it follows that the bank will choose its action as if it will receive
with certainty the lowest possible payment, xworst. This completes the characterization
of banksoptimal actions.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Case (i):   2l (p). We prove the statement by showing that banks payo¤s (and
thus solvencies) and actions are the same as in the no-uncertainty benchmark (which is
characterized in Proposition 1).
To this end, it su¢ ces to show that the payments and actions of the no-uncertainty
benchmark constitute a partial equilibrium also in this case. To show this, rst consider
the actions of banks with distance d  1. Recall that these banksoptimal actions are
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characterized exactly as in the no-uncertainty benchmark. Moreover, in the conjectured
equilibrium, they receive the same payment from their forward neighbors, x = Q1 [d  1],
as in the no-uncertainty benchmark. Consequently, they optimally choose the same ac-
tions. Next consider the actions of banks with distance d  2. Given   2l (p), and the
size of the domino e¤ect D (p)  1, these banks choose the aggressive action, Aj0 = B,
in the no-uncertainty benchmark. In particular, the bank at distance d = 2 chooses the
aggressive action since it does not make any losses from cross-claims. With uncertainty,
recall that banks with distance d  2 act as if they are at distance 2. Thus, these banks
optimally choose the aggressive action also with uncertainty. It follows that the partial
equilibrium with no-uncertainty continues to be a partial equilibrium with uncertainty.
This analysis also veries for this case that the banksactions and payments can be
written as a function of their distance [cf. Eq. 4]. Moreover, the function Q1 [d] is weakly
increasing because it is the same as in the no-uncertainty benchmark.
Case (ii):  > 2l (p). To prove this claim, rst consider the banks with distance d  1.
It can be seen that these banksoptimal actions and payments are the same as in the no-
uncertainty benchmark. Since  > 2l (p), the size of the domino e¤ect satises D (p)  2.
Consequently, banks with distance d  1 are insolvent and they choose Aj0 = S, proving
the claim for these banks.
Consider next the banks with distance d  2. Recall that these banks act as if they
are at distance ~d = 2. Given the characterization for banks with distance d  1, the
bank at distance ~d = 2 receives the payment, Q1 [1], which is the same as in the no-
uncertainty benchmark. Consequently, these banks choose the action that the bank at
distance ~d = 2 would choose in the no-uncertainty benchmark. Since D (p)  2, all of
these banks optimally choose the precautionary action, Aj0 = S. It follows that the banks
with distance d  D (p) 1 are insolvent and their debt payments and equity values are the
same as in the no-uncertainty economy. The transition bank with distance D (p) is solvent
and its debt payment and equity value is also the same as in the no-uncertainty economy.
The banks with distance d  D (p) + 1 are also solvent and they pay Q1 [d] = z on their
debt. However, the equity values of these banks are di¤erent than the no-uncertainty
economy. In particular, the equity value of a bank with distance d  D (p)+1 is given by
Q2 [d] = y + (1  y) p < R:
This discussion proves the claim also for banks with distance d  2, and completes the
proof of the proposition.
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This analysis also veries for this case that the banksactions and payments can be
written as function of their distance [cf. Eq. 4]. Moreover, the function Q1 [d] is weakly
increasing because it is the same as in the no-uncertainty benchmark.
Proof of Proposition 4. There are three cases to consider. The rst case concerns a
shock, , that is weakly smaller than the available liquidity of two banks even when the
price of legacy assets is at its lowest level. In this case, part (i) of Proposition 3 applies
regardless of the price. Consequently, the bankspayo¤s and actions are the same as
the no-uncertainty benchmark. In particular, all banks with distance d  2 choose the
aggressive action, Aj0 = B. In view of condition (5), the asset demand from these banks
exceed the asset supply from distressed banks. This leads to an equilibrium price p = 1
and a domino e¤ect of size D (1). Furthermore, aggregate purchase of new assets is the
same as in Proposition 2.
The second case concerns a liquidity shock, , which is greater than the available
liquidity of two banks even when the price of legacy assets is at its highest level. In
this case, part (ii) of Proposition 3 applies regardless of the price. Consequently, there
is a ight-to-quality of size n. In particular, all banks choose the precautionary action,
Aj0 = S, which has two e¤ects. First, since all banks are sellers in the secondary market
(and there are no buyers), the market clearing condition (3) implies that p = pscrap.
Second, since all banks choose to keep their dollars in cash, no new assets are purchased,
i.e., Y = 0.
The third case concerns a liquidity shock, , which is weakly smaller than the available
liquidity of two banks when the price is at its highest level, but not when the price is
at its lowest level. In this case, there are multiple equilibria. To see this, rst suppose
legacy assets trade at their fair price, p = 1. With this price, the available liquidity,
l (1), is su¢ ciently large that part (i) of Proposition 3 applies. In particular, banks with
distance d  2 are potential buyers of the asset. This ensures that the fair price, p = 1,
corresponds to an equilibrium. Suppose, instead, that legacy assetsprice is at the re-sale
level, p = pscrap. With this price, the available liquidity, l (pscrap), is su¢ ciently small that
part (ii) of Proposition 3 applies. In particular, all banks (including banks with distance
d  2) are sellers in the secondary market. This ensures that the re-sale price, p = pscrap,
also corresponds to an equilibrium.
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D. Robustness to Collateralized CDS Contracts
In our setting, partial domino e¤ects lead to aggregate e¤ects because they increase banks
idiosyncratic counterparty risk from cross-exposures. A natural question is to what extent
this risk could be insured at date 0 (once banks learn about the shock). In practice,
banks could obtain some insurance by purchasing credit default swaps (CDS) on their
counterparties. However, as discussed in the main text, the CDS contracts that pay in
systemic events need to be collateralized to protect insurance buyers against a potential
default of the insurance seller. This appendix allows for collateralized CDS contracts at
date 0 and shows that our results are robust to this extension. The key insight is that,
while banks demand CDS insurance on their counterparties, the supply of insurance is
also restricted because of sellerscollateral constraints.
Consider the setting of Proposition 3 with network uncertainty and xed asset price
(for simplicity). Consider also parameters such that D (p)  2, so that banks are trying to
maximize their available liquidity at date 1 (in their worst case scenario). In this setting,
banks have a demand for insurance contracts that pay when they are distressed at date
1. To capture this aspect, suppose banks can invest at date 0 in insurance contracts on
the insolvencies of their forward neighbor banks. In particular, for each bank j, there is
a contract, Ij, that pays 1 dollar if bank j is insolvent at date 1 (i.e., if it pays qj1 < 1).
Suppose also that insurance contracts, fIjgj, must be individually and fully collateralized.
In particular, the insurance seller must pledge 1 unit of cash as collateral for each unit
of insurance contract she sells at date 0. Each contract, Ij, is traded at date 0 in a
competitive market at price f j 2 (0; 1), which will be endogenously determined.
The collateral constraint implies that banks within the network choose not to sell
insurance contracts. To see this, note that selling the contract, Ij, requires the bank to
pledge 1   f j dollars of cash (in addition to f j dollars which she raises from the sale).
In particular, selling insurance reduces banksavailable liquidity at date 1 (even though
it may increase their return at date 2). Given that banks are trying to maximize their
available liquidity, they choose not to sell insurance. Put di¤erently, network uncertainty
not only increases banksdemand for insurance, but it also naturally decreases their supply
of insurance.
It follows that insurance contracts must be sold by an agent outside the nancial
network. Suppose the outside agent has yout dollars at date 0 and consumes only at
the end of date 1. Suppose the outside agent does not know the nancial network. In
addition, suppose also that the outside agent does not know the identity of the original
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distressed bank, b0.19 Importantly, the outside agent knows that the size of the domino
e¤ect will be exactly D (i.e., not all of the banking system can go under). This is the
main feature that will facilitate insurance.
Let xj denote the amount of contract Ij sold by the outside agent. We conjecture an
equilibrium for the insurance market in which f j  f 2 (0; 1) for each j and xj  x for
each j. That is, all banksinsurance contracts trade at the same price and the outside
agent sells equal number of contracts.
To characterize this equilibrium, rst consider the supply of insurance by the outside
agent. This agents portfolio choice problem can be written as:
max
~x0
yout + ~xfn  ~xD, (17)
s.t. n~x (1  f)  yout.
The rst line is the outside agents expected prot: For each contract she sells, she collects
fn dollars in premiums and she expects to pay D dollars. Note that, even though the
outside agent does not know the network, it knows that exactly D banks will fail. The
second line of (17) is the outside agents budget constraint. For each contract she sells,
she raises f dollars. However, she needs to put an additional, 1  f , dollars as collateral.
The total amount of collateral she pledges cannot exceed her available collateral, yout.
Problem (17) implies that as long as fn > D, which we will verify in equilibrium, the
outside bank sells as much insurance as possible. That is:
x =
yout
n (1  f) . (18)
Next consider the demand for insurance by banks. To maximize their available liq-
uidity at date 1, banks, fbjgn 1j=1 , spend all of their date 0 resources to buy insurance
on their respective forward neighbor banks. This is because they buy insurance at price
f < 1 (which is fully collateralized), that gives them 1 dollar at date 1 in their worst
case scenario (when their forward neighbor is insolvent). Thus, these banksdemand for





With these insurance purchases, their available liquidity at date 1 (when their forward
19This assumption is only made for simplicity. The results do not change if we assume the outside
agent knows b0 (i.e., she knows as much as the inside banks).
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neighbor is insolvent) becomes:




Consider next the original distressed bank, b0. This bank cannot increase its available
liquidity by buying insurance on its forward neighbor, because its forward neighbor will
always be solvent. On the other hand, this bank is indi¤erent between any level of
insurance (because it will be insolvent regardless of its action). To keep the analysis and
the notation simple, consider equilibria in which this banks insurance demand is also
given by (19), which leads to an available liquidity of 0 dollars at date 1.
Given this characterization of insurance purchases and available liquidities, the size of
the domino e¤ect can be calculated as before. In particular, the analogue of Eq. (8) in
this setting is given by:






Note that when f is lower, more liquidity is available to banks in distress, which leads to
a smaller domino e¤ect.
The equilibrium price of insurance is characterized by equating the supply of insurance










+ l (p) .
Note that insurance is expensive when the aggregate collateral of the insurance sellers,




su¢ ciently small, f is close 1, which has two implications. First, the condition, fn > D
[which lead to Eq. (18)], is veried because n > D. Second, banksavailable liquidity in
(20) is close to l (p). Consequently, the equilibrium is qualitatively similar to the earlier
setting without insurance.
This analysis illustrates that, as long as the collateral of insurance sellers outside
the nancial network is scarce, the CDS market does not overturn our results. The
behavior of the CDS market during the recent Bear Sterns and Lehman debacles is broadly
consistent with this analysis. Du¢ e (2011) describes that the demand for insurance spiked
in both episodes (measured by novation requests), and that this demand could not be met
by insurance sellers (dealers). These observations suggest that collateralized insurance
contracts might fail to eliminate fully the counterparty risk in systemic episodes, because
the supply of this type of insurance is also limited.
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